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SANTA FE INDUSTRIES, INC. v. GREEN:
AN ANALYSIS TWO YEARS LATER
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly two years since the Supreme Court decided
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.' Although the outcome of that
decision should have surprised no one, since the trend of the Court
clearly had been to constrict the scope of the federal securities legisla-
tion,2 the case was a major decision that will have a substantial
impact on the development of corporate law in this country. Indeed,
it may turn out to be one of the most significant corporate cases
decided by the Supreme Court in recent years.
Since by this point the dust has settled from the case,3 it seems
appropriate to examine the decision in light of the developments that
have occurred in the last two years. With the aid of hindsight, this
article will analyze the impact of Santa Fe Industries and attempt
to show that the decision is likely to generate both confusion and
abusive conduct.
11. THE SuPREME CouRT's OPINION IN
Santa Fe Industries
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. (Santa Fe) owned 95% of the stock of
Kirby Lumber Corporation (Kirby). Under the corporate law of Dela-
ware, a parent owning at least 90% of the outstanding stock of a
subsidiary corporation can merge that subsidiary into itself under a
simplified procedure referred to as a "short-form merger."' This pro-
cedure requires only the approval of the parent's board of directors
and does not require the affirmative vote of the shareholders of either
the parent or the subsidiary corporation. Further, the shareholders of
the subsidiary can be compensated with cash,' a maneuver that re-
moves the subsidiary's minority shareholders from continued partici-
pation in the enterprise. In 1974, Santa Fe employed the short-form
merger procedure to absorb Kirby into itself, offering each minority
shareholder of Kirby $150 per share. Although the minority share-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., Centre College, 1966; J.D., Uni-
versity of Kentucky, 1969; LL.M., Harvard University, 1971.
1. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The case was decided March 23, 1977.
2. See note 32 infin.
3. Interestingly, the case has not generated the amount of scholarly comment one
might imagine. But see Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects IOb.15s Proscription Against
Corporate Mismanagement, 6 Sac. REG. L.J. 3 (1978). There has been, however, some
student comment on the case. 48 Mms. L.J. 872 (1977); 9 Tax. TcH. L. Ray. 211
(1978); 52 TuL. L. Rav. 641 (1978); 46 U. CINN. L. Rav. 858 (1977); 29 U. FLL L. Ray.
761 (1977).
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1975).
5. Id.
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holders who were unhappy with the exchange had an explicit remedy
in the appraisal rights afforded shareholders under Delaware law,, the
plaintiff chose to pursue a remedy under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.7
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a
claim on which relief could be granted,8 but the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed,' holding that neither misrepresentation nor non-
disclosure was necessary for recovery under Rule 10b-5.'1 It was the
Court of Appeals' view that "a complaint alleges a claim under Rule
10b-5 when it charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form
merger, that the majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary
duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the merger
without any justifiable business purpose.""
The Supreme Court reversed,"2 holding that the underlying statute,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, established the
limits of an action brought under Rule 10b-5. Since section 10(b)
made it "unlawful . . . to use . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device,"' 3 mere unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty could not pro-
vide the basis for recovery under Rule 10b-5." Rather, such a recovery
required the presence of some manipulation or deception, which the
Supreme Court was unable to find in Santa Fe Industries. Because
6. Id. § 262 (Supp. 1978).
7. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b-5 (1978), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
8. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
9. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
10. Id. at 1287.
11. Id. at 1291.
12. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
13. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976), states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contrav-
ention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
14. At one point the Court stated that there was "no indication that Congress
meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception." 430 U.S. at
473.
[Vol. 30:187
SANTA FE INDUSTRIES
the case was presented to the Court "on the premise that the com-
plaint failed to allege a material misrepresentation or material failure
to disclose,"" "deceptive" conduct could not be established. Also, the
Court was unable to find any "manipulative" conduct within the
meaning of section lW(b). The Court described manipulation as
"'virtually a term of art'" and stated that "the term refers generally
to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that
are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market ac-
tivity."' 6 The Court found no such allegation in the Santa Fe
Industries complaint, which it characterized as involving "corporate
mismanagement. . ., in which the essence of the complaint is that
shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary."
It appears, therefore, that civil liability under Rule 10b-5 requires
the presence of conduct that is "manipulative" or "deceptive" within
the meaning of section 10(b) and that the proscribed conduct may
include only misstatements, nondisclosures, and manipulative de-
vices "artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead inves-
tors. . . ."" Moreover, instances of unfairness, fraud, or breach of
fiduciary duty that occur in connection with purchases or sales of
securities are not withhj the proscription of Rule 10b-5 and section
10(b), unless, of course, the conduct involved amounts to manipula-
tion or deception.
m. THE IhuAcr OF Santa Fe Industries ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REFEDIES UNDER RuLE 10b-5
On its face, Santa Fe Industries appears to be a clear decision. One
should be wary, however, in assuming that Santa Fe Industries is
without interpretive problems." Indeed, cases have already arisen
that suggest the clarity of Santa Fe Industries may be more apparent
than real. These decisions indicate that some courts may be unwilling
to apply Santa Fe Industries rigidly, especially when faced with com-
pelling circumstances.
For example, in Goldberg v. Meridor,2 a derivative action, a share-
holder of Universal Gas & Oil Company (UGO) alleged that there had
been a violation of Rule 10b-5 when UGO sold its stock to its parent,
Maritimecor, in exchange for all of Maritimecor's assets and UGO's
assumption of Maritimecor's liabilities. The plaintiff claimed, in
connection with the exchange, that the terms were unfair to UGO and
that there had been a failure to disclose certain material facts regard-
15. Id. at 474.
16. Id. at 476.
17. Id. at 477.
18. Id.
19. The Supreme Court has denied petitions for certiorari in several cases seeking
further refinement of the scienter requirement. E.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail,
Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
20. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
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ing both the value of the consideration received by UGO and the
conflict of interest among the parties.
In order to fit the complaint within Rule 10b-5, the Meridor court
had to overcome two conceptual difficulties. The first problem, iden-
tifying the deceptive or manipulative conduct necessary to meet the
standards of Santa Fe Industries, arose because the board of UGO
was controlled by Maritimecor (UGO's parent). Thus the board pre-
sumably knew of the unfair purchase price and the undisclosed facts,
including the alleged conflict of interest among the principals. The
court indicated, however, in apparent reliance on the rule derived
from Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,2' that such knowledge by the board
of UGO did not negate the possibility of fraud:
[T]here is deception of the corporation (in effect, of its minority
shareholders) when the corporation is influenced by its controlling
shareholder to engage in a transaction adverse to the corporation's
interests (in effect, the minority's shareholders' interests) and there
is nondisclosure or misleading disclosures as to the material facts of
the transaction. "Y
This apparently means, then, that knowledge of a board of directors
in a conflict situation, such as Meridor, will not be imputed to the
corporation, and thus disclosures must be made to the minority
shareholders.
This holding, however, raised problems of establishing causation in
the particular transaction. The problem was that the board of direc-
tors, not the shareholders, was the decisionmaking body for the sale
of stock. Because of this it was difficult to establish that any harm
was caused to the corporation by the alleged nondisclosures and mis-
statements made to the shareholders, since they were not the body
with the power to authorize the sale.
The Meridor court, however, was able to find the possibility of
harm in the transaction. The reasoning of the court was that the
shareholders had available certain statutory and common law rights
to enjoin the sale of stocks by their corporation at a price that was
unfairly low. Since these rights could be enforced by injunctive ac-
tions instituted in state courts, the court concluded that the com-
plaining minority shareholders in Meridor were harmed when they
were "lulled. . . into security by a deceptive disclosure . . . ."I' and
thus prevented from exercising their right to enjoin the unfair trans-
actions.
Wright v. Heizer Corporation,4 a Seventh Circuit case, resembles
Meridor. The Heizer Corporation, which controlled International
Digisonics Corporation (IDC) through stock ownership and domina-
tion of its board, had caused IDC's board to pledge to it (Heizer) all
21. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
22. 567 F.2d at 217.
23. Id. at 220.
24. 560 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
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the stock of Talent & Residuals, Inc., a subsidiary of IDC. Sharehold-
ers of IDC brought a derivative suit for violation of Rule 1Ob-5,1
claiming a failure to disclose certain material facts to IDC. As in
Meridor, the court was faced with the problem of identifying a
"deception" of IDC, since IDC's board was controlled by Heizer and
thus was presumed to have knowledge of all the terms and facts
surrounding the pledge. The court found, however, that failure to
disclose to 11DC's shareholders constituted the requisite "deception"
and determined that Heizer was obliged to disclose the material facts
concerning the transaction to the independent shareholders prior to
its consummation.2 6
In Heizer, causation was again the problem, since IDC's board, and
not the shareholders, had the power to pledge the securities. Thus, it
was difficult to see how the corporation could be deceived by a failure
to make disclosures to a group without power to authorize the pledge.
The Seventh Circuit resolved this dilemma in the same manner em-
ployed by the Meridor court. It determined that if the shareholders
had known the material facts surrounding the pledge transaction
they could have taken action under state law to enjoin the pledge.
Accordingly, the corporation had been harmed in fact by nondis-
closure to the shareholders, since complete disclosure would have
enabled them to prevent the transaction.
It is not impossible to defend the Meridor-Heizer analysis as a
proper application of Rule 10b-5 in a derivative suit. In both cases a
corporation engaged in securities transactions within the require-
ments of Blue Chip Stamps.n Although the board of directors was
fully informed of the facts surrounding the transaction, and although
the board of directors was the entity that had the power to sell the
corporation's stock, there was another entity that had the power to
stop the sale. Because the shareholders could utilize the state courts
to enjoin the sale of stock at a price below the fair market value,21 one
can view the shareholders as the ultimate decisionmaker for the cor-
poration and a failure to disclose to them as a failure to disclose to
the corporation. Thus, it is possible to say that the corporation was
deceived by the failure to disclose to the shareholders, and that there
was resulting harm to the corporation, because the improper sale
would have been enjoined if the shareholders had known the true
facts.
25. It appears that a pledge transaction does constitute a purchase or sale under
the securities acts. See S.E.C. v. Guild Films Co., Inc., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
26. 560 F.2d at 247.
27. In the case of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
the Supreme Court held that in order to recover under Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff must
be a purchaser or seller of securities.
28. The action of the board of directors in selling the corporation's stock at below
its fair value would violate the rule of equitable contribution. See N. LATrIN,
CORPORAIONS 471 (2d ed. 1971).
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This analysis, however compelling, seems too great a departure
from Santa Fe Industries, perhaps to the point of rupture. The
problem, of course, is that Meridor and Heizer are really cases in
which the very nub of the complaint was that the corporation had
been treated unfairly by its fiduciaries. A corporate fiduciary acting
on behalf of the corporation treated that corporation unfairly by sell-
ing stock for a price below the fair market value. There was no decep-
tion of the corporation in any real sense, since the entity responsible
for determining the terms of the sale was fully informed. Accordingly,
the decisionmaking process was not contaminated by any undisclosed
information or manipulation, but rather by a breach of manage-
ment's fiduciary duty to obtain a fair price for the stock."
It is difficult to assess the impact of Meridor and Heizer on the
development of the law in this area. Although one could view these
cases merely as insignificant aberrations, a critical analysis may lead
one to view them as symptomatic of a significant defection from the
rationale of Santa Fe Industries that will be followed by other lower
federal courts. Simply stated, Meridor and Heizer may reflect an
unwillingness on the part of federal courts to dismiss compelling cases
under the Santa Fe Industries decision.
It is easy to understand why a court would be reluctant to dismiss
claims such as those in Meridor and Heizer. In each case the allega-
tion before the court indicated that clear "wrongs" had been commit-
ted against the corporation in the context of a securities transaction.
The wrongs, however, involved unfairness rather than any deception
of the corporate decisionmaker. Thus, Santa Fe Industries would
seem to necessitate a dismissal. Such a disposition, however, may
rankle some judges, since it would require the court to divest itself of
jurisdiction over a securities transaction where a clearly identifiable
wrong has been committed to the detriment of the real party in inter-
est. It appears that the courts in Meridor and Heizer were unwilling
to take that step, and it is not difficult to imagine that some other
federal courts would respond similarly to such compelling cases. If
this turns out to be true, so that Meridor and Heizer are not merely
isolated eruptions from lower federal courts, the apparent clarity of
Santa Fe Industries will be lost."°
29. It should be recalled that in Santa Fe Industries the Supreme Court found a
complaint inadequate where "the essence of the complaint [was] that shareholders
were treated unfairly by a fiduciary." 430 U.S. at 477.
30. Already there have been a number of cases attempting to define the types of
conflicts in a board of directors that necessitate disclosures to shareholders. Maldon-
ado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F.
Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The cases, however, probably should not
be read as manifestations of unnecessary confusion, but rather as a refinement of a
more general rule that conflicts in the board require disclosures to shareholders.
[Vol. 30:187
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IV. A CRrrmcAL ANALYSIS OF Santa Fe Industries
Surely, one should be concerned about the potential for confusion
described in the preceding section of this paper. Such confusion can
deflect and delay the orderly development of the law in this area and
can result in disparate resolutions of similar issues.
This confusion, however, is merely symptomatic of a more funda-
mental flaw in the Santa Fe Industries decision. Simply stated, the
Court reached an unsound conclusion in that case, and as a result
minority shareholders of corporations are now more vulnerable to the
machinations of the majority interests in the corporation. By denying
minority shareholders the right to enforce a fairness constraint under
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has denied minority shareholders a
meaningful protection from majority oppression and thus has in-
creased the probability that minority shareholders will be mistreated
by the majority.
As described earlier,3 the Court's basis for the decision in Santa
Fe Industries appears quite simple, since the Court seems to have
placed principal emphasis on the words "deceptive" and
"manipulative" from section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Such a simplistic explanation of the case, however, ignores a
significant trend in the Supreme Court. This trend, which involves
nearly a dozen cases, has resulted in a substantial constriction of the
protections afforded by the federal securities legislation., Considered
as a group, these cases strongly manifest notions of federalism and
indicate that the Supreme Court is determined to relegate corporate
shareholders to state remedies for many of the wrongs that arise in
securities transactions.-" Nowhere is this manifestation stronger than
in Santa Fe Industries. u
More specifically, Santa Fe Industries seems to indicate that Rule
10b-5 cannot be utilized to relieve a shareholder from unfairness that
occurs in securities transactions. Thus, Rule 10b-5 provides no relief
if one shareholder with power bludgeons a powerless shareholder into
participating in an unfair securities transaction, unless the sale is
effected through some misstatement, nondisclosure" or
31. See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
32. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provi-
dent Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49
(1975); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Pet.
Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
33. See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977).
35. One author has suggested that the Court in Santa Fe Industries intended to
include under the rubric of "deception" certain conduct that does not involve misstate-
ments or nondisclosures. The writer stated:
Mr. Justice White must have intended "deception" to mean something in
1979]
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"manipulation" (a term that seems to have a very limited meaning)."°
The abused shareholder must look to the states for some remedy.
Unfortunately, there often are no effective state remedies for share-
holders who are treated unfairly in the context of a securities transac-
tion.
Generally, shareholders who have attempted to protect themselves
in state forums against unfairness have relied on common law fidu-
ciary obligations, as opposed to any state statute. The reason is rather
obvious. Other than voting and appraisal rights, which are applicable
in certain situations and will be discussed later in this paper, state
statutes provide little protection from unfairness for shareholders."?
Accordingly, the focus of this discussion will be the inadequacy of the
relief availabe under state common law to shareholders who claim
they have been treated unfairly."
In describing the plight of minority shareholders under state com-
mon law, one is forced to rely on some generalizations for at least two
reasons. First, since each state's highest appellate court makes final
decisions on these issues, uniformity among the states in law or phi-
losophy is most unlikely. Second, even within a single jurisdiction,
there are numerous corporate configurations in which powerless
shareholders can be treated unfairly in securities transactions.
Freezeouts, 31 single company recapitalizations, and mergers between
addition to misrepresentations and omissions; otherwise, he would not have
used all three terms in the disjunctive. He undoubtedly chose his words
carefully, for lower courts had established a meaning for the word
"deception." The scope of deception includednonverbal acts and was not
limited to the common-law sense.
Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects lOb-5's Proscriptions Against Corporate
Mismanagement, 6 SE c. REG. L.J. 3, 14-15 (1978).
36. In Santa Fe Industries, the Court seemed to limit manipulation to conduct
"intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." 430 U.S. at
476.
37. In describing state statutory laws, Professor Folk has stated:
Almost without exception, the key movement in corporation law revisions
is toward even greater permissiveness .... Explicitly positing an objective
of "flexibility," statutory revisers ... have usually sought to enlarge the
ambit of freedom of corporate management to take whatever action it may
wish .... Indeed the new statutes seem to be exclusively concerned with
only one constituent of the corporate community - management - and have
disregarded the interests of shareholders and creditors, let alone more tan-
gentially interested parties, such as employees, customers, and the general
public.
Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409,410 (1968).
38. In describing the protection provided by state courts one noted commentator
has stated that "on only rare occasions in the last decade has a state appellate court
been moved to consider the inadequacy of some of the traditional theories of fiduciary
obligation and to formulate new concepts to cope with the increasingly complex trans-
actions of the business and financial communities." Jennings, Federalization of Corpo-
ration Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 Bus. LAw. 991, 999-1000 (1976).
39. Within recent years there has been a substantial amount of literature on
freezeouts. See Borden, Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L.
Rxv. 987 (1974); Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1978);
[Vol. 30:187
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affiliated companies are examples of situations in which powerless
shareholders may be called upon to make unfair concessions to the
majority interests of the corporations. Because of these factors, it is
impossible to deal exhaustively with every potentially abusive con-
figuration in every jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by examining certain
jurisdictions and certain configurations, one may draw conclusions
about the probable relief available to shareholders foreclosed from a
federal remedy under Santa Fe Industries.
Although it would be a substantial exaggeration to claim that
states never provide remedies" for shareholders who have been
treated unfairly,' it is apparent that the protection afforded by state
remedies has been less than perfect.'" Professor Cary's classic piece,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware," con-
tains the best exposition of one state's failure to protect shareholders
from the unfairness that can be foisted on them. Cary treats a num-
ber of situations in which minority shareholders of Delaware corpora-
tions have attempted to hold the management and majority interests
in a corporation to a fairness standard. His conclusion is that the
Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. Rzv. 487,490-
96 (1976).
40. While it is not the purpose of this article to explore the procedural differences
between pressing a federal claim under Rule 10b-5 and pressing a state claim, it seems
to be conceded generally that plaintiffs have a distinct advantage in the federal sys-
tem. Professor Bromberg has stated that 10b-5 is "more attractive in many cases
because of its ability to cross borders for jurisdiction, venue and process. Other factors
on the federal side include a background and framework sympathetic to the investor
and discovery proceedings more liberal than those in some states." 1 A. BROmZmmo,
SECURiTES LAW: FRAUV, S.E.C. RU=Z 10b-5 § 2.7(2), at 57 (1977). See also 1 A.
BROMBERO, supra, § 4.7(120), at 84.3; Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum:
The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332, 333-35 (1969); Jen-
nings, supra note 38, at 1000. See text accompanying notes 84-96 infra.
41. For example, the rule of equitable contribution is a state common law doctrine
that provides remedies against directors who sell their company's stock for less than
the fair value of the stock. See N. LA7rN, supra note 28, at 471. One writer concluded
that: "While the criticisms of state law are not without foundation, it is also true that
it has been far from impotent." Sherrard, Fiduciaries and Fairness Under Rule 1ob-5,
29 VAND. L. Rxv. 1385, 1418 (1976).
42. Although not directly on point, it is at least instructive to consider the way state
courts have protected shareholders from the negligence of the corporation's officers and
directors. While it is clear that directors and officers of a corporation owe a duty of
reasonable care when acting on behalf of the corporation, the application of that
standard has been so loose that one writer has characterized the potential liability for
negligence as "largely fictional in practical terms." Scott, Fears and Phobias: Manage-
ment Liability and Insurance in Thrift Institutions, 88 BANKMnO L.J. 124. 130 (1971).
Professor Cary has stated: "The standard of duty of care in this country is indeed
at a low level." Cary & Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present
Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61 (Special Issue 1972). Mr. Harris
responded, however, that the exposure of a director or officer may not be properly
evaluated merely by examining decided cases-and failing to account for out of court
settlements and suits currently pending. Id. at 66.67.
43. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974).
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Delaware courts have not provided adequate protection to the share-
holders of Delaware corporations, since the cases indicate that
"[c]onsciously or unconsciously, fiduciary standards and the stan-
dards of fairness generally have been relaxed.""
Although Cary limits his critique to cases arising in Delaware, the
pressures Cary describes as causing or at least contributing to this
relaxation of the fairness constraint are not necessarily limited to that
state. His point, restated in somewhat less refined terms, is that
states may fear the corporate relocation likely to follow any attempt
to enforce strict fairness standards. This simple and substantial eco-
nomic pressure, he concludes, dampens any realistic hope that states
like Delaware will be responsive to claims of unfairness raised by
shareholders. 5
There have been recent Delaware cases testing Cary's insight con-
cerning the predilection of the Delaware judiciary. In Singer v. Mag-
navox Co.4" the minority shareholders of Magnavox had been frozen
out47 of the company by a merger between Magnavox and an affili-
ated corporation. The shareholders brought suit to have the transac-
tion set aside, claiming that the merger's only purpose was to remove
them from the corporation at a grossly inadequate price.48 The Su-
preme Court of Delaware reversed the lower court's dismissal for
failure to state a claim, holding that a "merger, made for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the
corporate process; and the complaint, which so alleges in this suit,
44. Id. at 670.
45. Cary is not the only commentator to suggest that Delaware provides inadequate
safeguards for shareholders. Professor Kaplan, while purporting not "to verify or com-
ment upon" Cary's conclusions, has stated that "in general I share the view that
Delaware has diligently engendered a corporate climate too favorable to management
...." Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the Corporation, 31
Bus. LAW. 883, 889 (1976).
46. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
47. In a recent article, Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have suggested that the
constraints applied to freezeouts should not be uniform but instead should be deter-
mined by the particular type of freezeout involved. In the case of "two-step, or inte-
grated" mergers (where an independent company acquires control of a target through
a tender offer and then proceeds to freeze out the remaining shareholders), the authors
suggest that no fiduciary obligation should be owed to the shareholders of the acquired
company, since it is essentially an arms length transaction. As for "pure going private"
transactions (where majority simply freezes out minority), the authors suggest they
should be forbidden, since the only purpose of such a transaction is to permit the
majority to seize the interest of the minority at a bargain price. In the case ofn"mergers
of longheld affiliates," the authors suggest that the transaction should be subjected to
a fairness constraint, since there is a chance for abuse, but there is also the possibility
of resulting economies, which are beneficial and should be encouraged. Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978).
48. Although Singer involved a long-form merger, a subsequent case in Delaware
has indicated that the same fiduciary standard is applicable in short form mergers.
Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978).
[Vol. 30:187
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states a cause of action for violation of fiduciary duty for which the
Court may grant. . . relief. .. .
Although the holding in Singer appears to establish an important
new precedent in Delaware, "  arguably the more important facet of
the case is the general attitude reflected by the opinion. Not only does
the holding itself reflect a concern with fair treatment for minority
shareholders, but the court also went to some lengths to proclaim that
the judiciary of Delaware does indeed demand high standards of fair-
ness in corporate actions.' One could infer from this shift in attitude
by the Delaware court that Professor Cary's criticism had been effec-
tive; it appears that the Delaware court was attempting to vindicate
its past behavior and demonstrate and effect a new attitude of fair-
ness.
512
Within one month, however, a second opinion by the Delaware
court effectively limited Singer's impact. Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc.-" involved a fact pattern similar to Singer's.
The minority shareholders of Kliklok Corporation, which was 81%
owned by International General Industries, Inc. (IGI), were attempt-
49. 380 A.2d at 980. It is interesting to note that there are some differences in
language between the Magnavox opinion as first reported in Securities Regulation &
Law Report and the final rendering of the opinion in the Atlantic Reporter. The case
as reported in Securities Regulation & Law Report reads: "Use of corporate power to
eliminate the minority is a violation of that duty, if done without a valid business
purpose." [1977] SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 422 § E-6. As finally reported in Atlantic
Reporter, the last seven words of the preceding passage are eliminated, and the sen-
tence reads: "use of corporate power solely to eliminate the minority is a violation of
that duty." 380 A.2d at 980. One could speculate that the elimination of the last words,
"if done without a valid business purpose," was due to a possible conflict with Tanzer
v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), which was decided one
month after Magnavox. Tanzer is discussed at text accompanying notes 53-56.
50. One commentator has referred to Singer as a "landmark decision." McBride,
Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers - The Aftermath of Singer u.
The Magnavox Company; 33 Bus. LAw. 2231 (1978). It is clear that prior to Singer there
were Delaware decisions indicating that a minority shareholder could be eliminated
from a future equity participation in a corporation. David J. Green & Co. v. Schenley
Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del.
Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311 (1962), affl'd, 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962); Coyne v. Park &
Tilford Dist. Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d 785 (1958), affl'd, 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154
A.2d 893 (1959).
51. At one point the court stated: "Delaware courts have long announced and
enforced high standards which govern the internal affairs of corporations chartered
here. . . ." 380 A.2d at 976.
52. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 47. The authors have criticized the result
in Singer, since it involved a "two-step merger" (i.e., the freezeout followed a tender
offer by North American Phillips Corporation, which resulted in North American's
having acquired control of Magnavox). As described earlier in these footnotes, Brudney
and Chirelstein believe no fiduciary obligation should attach to such a transaction.
Brudney & Chirestein, supra note 47, at 1362-63.
53. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). One writer has concluded that the Delaware court's
"decision in Tanzer is consistent with its reasoning in Singer." McBride, supra note
50, at 2239. It seems to this writer, however, that the spirit of the two cases is markedly
different.
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ing to stop a merger that would have resulted in their being frozen
out of Kliklok. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed a Court of
Chancery opinion refusing the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction. In the course of the opinion the Delaware court indicated
that it would enjoin a freeze out if the corporation's "real purpose
• . .[were] to rid itself of unwanted minority shareholders . . .
That, however, seems to be the limit of the constraint, since the court
held that "IGI, as a stockholder of Kliklok, had a right to look to its
own corporate concerns in determining how to conduct the latter's
affairs, including a decision to cause it to merge.""5 Thus, it appears
that a Delaware court will enjoin a proposed freezeout under Singer
only if the sole purpose of the transaction is to freeze out the minor-
ity; if the majority shareholder can demonstrate that the merger
served any other purpose, even the satisfaction of some selfish and
unique need of the parent (or majority shareholder), the injunction
will not issue. The parent's successful claim in Tanzer, for example,
that the merger would "facilitate [its] long term debt financing,"5 6
suggests how easily a majority shareholder can justify a freezeout.
Since Tanzer, however, there has been one case where the Chancel-
lor looked critically at the alleged business purpose justifying a
freezeout. In Young v. Vaihi, Inc.,57 which involved the freezing out
of the minority interests of a subsidiary corporation, the parent com-
pany justified the action as a means to eliminate the risk of conflict
transactions between the parent and the subsidiary and to gain a
savings through filing consolidated tax returns. The court rejected
this as a valid business purpose that would justify a freezeout, hold-
ing that the savings were small and attainable by other means, and
that the conflict rationale was in fact contrived.
A critical analysis of these cases, however, indicates no fundamen-
tal shift in the attitude of the Delaware court that Professor Cary
found offensive. Although Singer at first appeared to reflect a new
attitude for Delaware, Tanzer quickly and substantially limited the
Singer decision. While one could interpret the Valhi decision as a
sound and rigorous application of Tanzer, it is better read as a case
that arose before corporate lawyers had learned the proper terms to
employ in defense of freezeouts or the type of proof required to
legitimize them. As counsel becomes more sophisticated in the teach-
ings of Tanzer, it seems probable that freezeouts will continue sub-
stantially unimpeded.
Certainly there is historic precedent in Delaware for such an as-
sumption. One need only read the Delaware cases involving mergers
among affiliated companies to discover that high-sounding principles
often break down in application. Thus, although an early case pro-
54. 379 A.2d at 1124.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
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claimed that in a merger between affiliated corporations the parent
corporation must "bear the burden of establishing its entire fair-
ness," that principle atrophied to the point that Delaware courts
would intervene only if there was fraud in the merger."s The situation
deteriorated so badly that one commentator, a member of the Dela-
ware bar, was forced to admit that "some confusion. . . developed
as to whether the [fairness] doctrine had any continued viability."c'
In light of this, it would be premature to cite the Singer case as any
signal that Delaware courts have altered their fundamental posture
in business cases. If history is any guide, Tanzer, not Singer, is the
lodestar for future development in corporate freezeouts in the Dela-
ware courts.
One may be inclined, however, to view Delaware to something of
an aberration, since the state does have a unique place in the scheme
of corporate regulation in this country. Clearly, other states can not
compare with Delaware in the corporate activity that takes place
inside her borders.' Thus, one might conclude that the pro-
management posture of the Delaware decisions may not be matched
in the same way in her sister states, where there is likely to be corre-
spondingly more hope of protection from unfairness.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that shareholders outside
Delaware can expect much better treatment than the fate described
by Professor Cary. Instead, the cases indicate that state courts have
been rather unsuccessful in assuring that powerless shareholders are
treated fairly by the controlling interests of a corporation. The prob-
lem can best be seen in the context of organic corporate changes.
In those situations shareholders without substantial power are
often called upon to exchange their stock for new securities in the
existing corporation, if the alteration is a single company recapitali-
zation, 2 for new securities in another company, if a merger is in-
58. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del.
1952).
59. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971);
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 202, 178 A.2d 311 (1962).
60. McBride, supra note 50, at 2250.
61. In describing the importance of Delaware, Professor Jennings has stated that
"40 percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are Delaware
Corporations. And it has been estimated that over 200 of the Fortune 500 largest
industrial corporations are ... incorporated in Delaware." Jennings, supra note 38,
at 992-93. See also Cary, supra note 43, at 668.
62. The following cases are examples of the alteration of shareholders' rights in the
context of a single company recapitalization. Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del.
1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F.
Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722
(1949); State ex reL Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298,31 N.W.2d 853 (1948); Franzblau
v. Capital Sec. Co., Inc., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 64 A.2d 644 (1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo
Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A.2d 215 (1944); Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 133
N.J. Eq. 214, 31 A.2d 200 (1943).
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volved,13 or perhaps even for cash, if a freezeout is involved." Al-
though the affected shareholders typically have voting rights relative
to the proposed change,65 those rights alone may prove ineffective to
protect them against the unfairness of the proposed alteration. For
example, if a parent merges with a subsidiary of which it owns 51%
or more of the stock, it is obvious that a disgruntled minority share-
holder of the subsidiary could not stop the merger through the exer-
cise of his voting rights.A6 Similarly, if a single company recapitaliza-
tion is involved, a preferred shareholder who owns 5% of the preferred
stock cannot vote down a proposal to change his liquidation rights.
Even shareholders with the raw voting power to throttle a proposed
change may be unable to protect themselves effectively from unfair-
ness, 7 since economic pressures and realities can cause them to forgo
exercising their power to reject the proposed alteration. For example,
much has been written about the disadvantageous position of pre-
ferred shareholders in single company recapitalizations"8 vis-a-vis the
common shareholders." Thus, even though under modem corporate
statutes a recapitalization altering the rights of preferred sharehold-
ers cannot be effected without the consent of a majority of the pre-
63. The following are examples of the alteration of shareholders' rights in the
context of a merger. Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co., 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281
A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427
(Del. Ch. 1968).
64. Two of the most recent cases involving freezeouts are Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), and Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969 (Del. 1977). See text accompanying notes 46-60 supra.
65. Under the Model Act, for example, shareholders affected by mergers and recap-
italizations must approve the alteration by a majority vote. MODEL BUs. CORtp. ACr
ANN. 2D §§ 59, 60, 73 (1971).
66. David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968) and
David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971), are
examples of cases in which minority shareholders were unable to protect themselves
through voting and thus were forced to attempt to enjoin the merger under general
standards of fairness.
67. In describing the position of minority shareholders subjected to a freezeout
through a merger, Brudney and Chirelstein have stated that "even if the merger plan
were made effective only when approved by a majority of the public stockholders, as
if the latter were a separate class, the barriers to concerted stockholder action in the
context of management's exclusive control of the proxy machinery would almost al-
ways assure a favorable vote." Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Merg-
ers and Takeovers, 88 HAv. L. REv. 297, 300 (1974).
68. Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock
Modifications, 26 Rrromas L. Rxv. 445 (1973); Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitaliza-
tions, 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 (1942); Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate
Changes, 1 W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1949); Meck, Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Pre-
ferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine, 55 HAv. L. REy. 71 (1941); Note, Protection for
Shareholder Interests in Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 68 COLUM.
L. Rav. 1030 (1958); Note, Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations - From
Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HRv. L. REv. 894 (1944).
69. For descriptions of the disadvantages of preferred shareholders, see Brudney,
supra note 68, at 460-61; Dodd, supra note 68, at 791-93.
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ferred shares,7 "disadvantages of economic position and of political
posture [enable] the commons to dominate the bargaining and effec-
tively to determine the result."'
It is not difficult to understand how the preferred shareholders can
be persuaded to accept an unfair bargain in a recapitalization if one
recalls that corporate management is typically chosen by the com-
mon shareholders.72 Management, the surrogate of the common
shareholder, has the power to declare and pay (or not to declare and
pay) dividends to the preferred shareholders and has control over the
proxy machinery. Management's potential adversaries, the preferred
shareholders, are usually both unorganized and widely scattered. It
is little wonder, in light of these factors, that preferred shareholders
have suffered at the hands of common shareholders in recapitaliza-
tions."
Notwithstanding the apparent abuse that has occurred in recapi-
talizations, and notwithstanding the persistent well-reasoned criti-
cism of commentators, the state courts generally have been ineffec-
tive in containing the unfairness that is often present in these situa-
tions. 5 In some of the cases, it is even unclear whether the court is
applying an unfairness norm or a fraud norm as the test for enjoining
a recapitalization." More typically, the norm is relatively clear, but
the analysis is unsound, as the court merely lists the pre-
recapitalization rights and the post-recapitalization rights of the pre-
ferred shareholders and then summarily decides that the recapitali-
zation does or does not pass muster.7 Usually, courts find that the
plans are fair,7 even where the evidence does not support that re-
sult.7 1
70. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D §§ 59, 60 (1971).
71. Brudney, supra note 68, at 448.
72. Typically, the contract of preferred shareholders does not provide for them to
vote. Accordingly, the common shareholders elect the directors. MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr
ANN. 2D § 36 (1971). Usually the directors then elect the officers of the corporation.
Id. § 50.
73. For a description of the disadvantages of preferred shareholders, see V. BauD-
NEY & M. CMELSIVN, CASES AND MATEIUALS ON CoRPoRA z FuwecE 209-11 (1972);
Brudney, supra note 68, at 448.
74. See authorities cited in note 68 supra.
75. For example, in Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260. 85 N.E.2d 722
(1949), a state court approved a recapitalization eliminating the accrued dividends of
preferred shareholders. The court apparently held the plan was fair because it had been
approved by a majority of the preferred shareholders, the company had no earned
surplus to pay dividends, and there had been a 50% reduction in the par value of the
common stock.
76. E.g., Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Franzblau
v. Capital Sec. Co., Inc., 2 N.J. Super. 517, 64 A.2d 644 (1949).
77. E.g., Bowman v. Armour & Co., 17 Ill. 2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 753 (1959); Dratz v.
Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341 (1949).
78. Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Goldman v.
Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co.,
325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341 (1949); Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., Inc., 2 N.J. Super.
517, 64 A.2d 644 (1949).
79. E.g., Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341 (1949).
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While the abuses growing out of recapitalizations have perhaps
been the most apparent, transactions structured as mergers also have
generated claims of abuse. Basically, the claims have arisen in situa-
tions similar to a recapitalization where the parties with the effective
power to set the terms of the merger have forced allegedly unfair
terms on the minority shareholders. As in the recapitalization cases,
courts generally have done a poor job protecting minority sharehold-
ers from overreaching. 0
Typically, the cases involve mergers between affiliated corpora-
tions, usually a parent and a subsidiary,8 or two corporations under
the common control of a parent or an individual. An example of the
latter is Matteson v. Ziebarth,2 where Mr. Ziebarth, the controlling
shareholder of Ziebarth Corporation, caused that company to be
merged into a newly formed company, Snowy, Inc., which was wholly
owned by Mr. Ziebarth and had been formed specifically to effect the
merger. The court refused to enjoin this merger, even though there
was evidence that Mr. Matteson, a minority shareholder of Ziebarth
Corporation, received new stock having a value that was substan-
tially less than the stock he surrendered. Specifically, Mr. Matteson
received new stock valued at 20 cents per share, while it appeared
that the only potential purchaser for his old stock had valued his
stock at about $3 per share s
80. For an especially bad decision, see Donohue v. Heuser, 239 S.W.2d 238 (Ky.
1951). The case was also unusual in that the abuse occurred in a consolidation between
two companies that apparently were not affiliated. All of the shareholders of Capital
Transit Company of Frankfort (Capital) approved a proposed consolidation between
Capital and Louisville Railway Company (Railway). All of Railway's common share-
holders and 91% of Railway's preferred shareholders also approved the consolidation.
Notwithstanding that vote, the disgruntled preferred shareholders who had voted
against the consolidation sued to enjoin the consolidation as unfair. The old preferred
stock had a $100 par value, a 5% cumulative dividend, no preference on dissolution,
and was non-callable. Importantly, there were arrearages of $100 per share owed to the
preferred, and it was clear that the common shareholders of Railway were using this
consolidation to eliminate that arrearage. The terms of the consolidation provided that
the old preferred shareholders would receive $2.50 in cash and one new share of pre-
ferred in the consolidated company that would have $80 par value, a 5% dividend rate,
and a preference to dividends on distribution. Additionally, the new preferred would
be callable.
Notwithstanding, inter alia, the loss of the $100 in accrued dividends, the court
approved the plan as fair.
The court did not attempt to quantify the value of the securities surrendered or
received by the preferred shareholders. Instead, it seemed to base its fairness decision
on the testimony of businessmen that the exchange was fair, the protection afforded
by the independent judgment of Railway's board of directors, and the fact that some
preferred shareholders favored the exchange.
81. E.g., Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32
A.2d 148 (1943).
82. 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
83. In the exchange, the court admitted "[ihe Ziebarth Corporation stock was
valued at twenty cents a share. . . ... Id. at 301, 242 P.2d at 1035. On the other hand,
the Gold Seal Corporation wanted (and later received) an option to purchase all of
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In short, state fiduciary concepts have not been the basis for sub-
stantial protection to minority shareholders in mergers. Notwith-
standing occasional high-sounding rhetoric,' there has been little
realistic protection provided by state fairness concepts. As Professor
Kaplan has stated:
Judicial review of the fairness of the terms of a merger is seldom
available in the absence of actual fraud unless there is the grossest
kind of disparity in exchange terms which can be considered equiva-
lent to constructive fraud. A few states still entertain injunction
proceedings against mergers on the basis of unfair and inequitable
terms but this is usually, in practice, a very barren potential for
remedy."
To this point, no mention has been made of the availability of
appraisal rights" as a protection against unfairness. Obviously, these
rights are intended to protect disgruntled shareholders against un-
fairness in certain instances and to provide a means for those share-
holders to withdraw from the corporation and receive fair compensa-
tion for their shares. Unfortunately, appraisal rights are an incom-
plete protection against unfairness.
In the first place, questions have been raised about the effective-
ness of appraisal rights as a mechanism for protecting shareholders
from overreachingY One author stated that the appraisal remedy is
Ziebarth Corporation's outstanding common stock for $100,000 or twenty-five percent
of the net profit of Gold Seal derived from the sale of "Snowy" bleach up to December
31, 1951, whichever sum was larger. Since there were 33,851 shares, the maximum per
share option price was $2.95. Id. at 290, 242 P.2d at 1029.
84. E.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952),
where the court declared that the parties proposing an affiliated merger must bear the
burden of demonstrating intrinsic fairness.
85. Kaplan, supra note 45, at 898. See also Jennings, supra note 38, at 998; Brudney
& Chirelstein, supra note 67, at 298: "[Ciourts rarely have been able to extend
fiduciary safeguards beyond the point of simple fraud."
86. State corporation laws generally provide shareholders the right to dissent from
certain actions taken by the corporation (usually limited to mergers, consolidations
and sales of assets) and to demand that the corporation repurchase the shareholders'
stock at a fair price. E.g., MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. 2D §§ 80, 81 (1971).
The appraisal sections of the Model Act have been substantially amended. See
Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights
(Sections 73, 74, 80, and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587 (1978). Because the amendments have
not yet been adopted by the states, references to the Model Act refer to the act prior
to the latest amendment.
87. Compare Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228-29, 260-61 (1962), with Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of
Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L.
Rxv. 1, 71-74, 84-86 (1969). Professor Vorenberg has listed at least three reasons why
appraisal rights may not provide satisfactory relief to disgruntled minority sharehold-
ers: 1) "resort to appraisal will. .. often give the stockholder less than his stock is
worth;" 2) "in some instances more may be at stake than whether the minority stock-
holder has a right to continue as such" (citing, for example, a loss of employment); 3)
"in many cases the most serious consequence... will be the impact of the federal
capital gains tax. .. ." Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's
Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1201-03 (1964).
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"technical; . . expensive; . . . uncertain in result, and, in the case
of a publicly held corporation, is unlikely to produce a better result
than could have been obtained on the market. . . . It is, in short, a
remedy of desperation."" Because of the technicalities, expense and
time involved in exercising one's appraisal rights, Professor Jennings
has concluded that the appraisal "remedy, though better than noth-
ing, cannot possibly be an adequate substitute for an equitable review
based upon fairness.""0
Even if one were convinced that appraisal rights effectively protect
disadvantaged shareholders, the protection afforded is limited by the
unavailability of appraisal rights in numerous instances where un-
fairness to minority shareholders is likely. For example, the alteration
of a shareholder's rights by means bf a single company recapitaliza-
tion generally does not trigger any appraisal rights." The Model Act,
as presently adopted by the states, provides that shareholders have
no right to dissent from an organic corporate change if their stock is
traded on a national exchange.' The Model Act also prohibits dissent
from a sale of all of a company's assets if the sale is for cash and the
proceeds are to be distributed within one year.2 A few states deny
appraisal rights if the shares were held by more than 2000 sharehold-
ers. 3
The point of all this is not to prove that appraisal rights are worth-
less, since it is clear that they do provide at least some protection
against unfairness.' The problem, however, is that the protection is
incomplete. Notwithstanding the attempt to ensure that sharehold-
ers receive fair value for their shares, the gaps in coverage and the
88. Eisenberg, supra note 87, at 85.
89. Jennings, supra note 38, at 999.
90. Under the Model Business Corporation Act 2d, as presently adopted by the
states, there are no rights to dissent and appraisal if the rights of shareholders are
altered by amendments to the articles of incorporation. In a few states, however,
certain alterations in the rights of such shareholders do trigger appraisal procedures.
For example, the Idaho statute permits a shareholder to dissent from certain corporate
changes, including "changes [in] the rights of the holders of any outstanding shares."
IDA sO CODE § 30-150 (1967). New amendments to the Model Act, not yet adopted by
the states, would permit appraisal in certain instances involving a single company
recapitalization. See Conard, supra note 86, at 2591.
91. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 80 (1971). This exception has been eliminated
from the Model Act by recent amendments. See Conard, supra note 86, at 2691, 2595.
92. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. 2D § 80 (1971).
93. E.g., DELAwARE CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1978).
94. One cannot easily dismiss the concerns of Jennings and Eisenberg, supra notes
38 and 87. Those commentators contend that the technical nature of appraisal rights,
the expense of exercising those rights, and the delay before a dissenting shareholder
receives his cash payment are factors that make the appraisal remedy less than perfect.
Clearly they are right, since those factors may cause a disgruntled shareholder to opt
for the more certain and immediate offer in the merger rather than take the uncer-
tainty and expense of appraisal. In some instances, however, the appraisal rights do
protect shareholders. Specifically, it may be that the threat of a large cash drain
caused by the exercise of appraisal rights will cause the merging companies to provide
exchange ratios that are at least fair enough to avoid massive appraisals.
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realities of exercising appraisal rights often leave shareholders unpro-
tected from overreaching.
Without belaboring this point further, it is possible to draw certain
conclusions from the foregoing discussion. Generally, it appears that
the application by state courts of statutory and common law con-
straints has been ineffective in protecting shareholders involved in
organic cbrporate changes. The problems have arisen in those situa-
tions where powerful parties involved in such changes are in a conflict
of interests situation and utilize their strategic advantage to bludgeon
the minority owners into concessions. In those situations the protec-
tion provided by state tribunals has been slight.
It is in this context that the serious flaw in the Santa Fe Industries
case becomes apparent. The Court, by refusing to litigate fairness
questions under Rule 10b-5 and thus relegating those questions to
state forums enforcing state standards, has ensured that minority
shareholders will continue to receive unfair compensation and inade-
quate protection. Simply stated, the Court has forced disgruntled
shareholders who claim they have been treated unfairly to look to
state laws for protection, and those state laws are demonstrably inad-
equate to protect those shareholders.
One could raise the question, however, of whether the protection
of shareholders would be increased by enforcing fairness under Rule
10b-5. Emphatically, this writer believes fairness would increase
under federal supervision. Many lawyers and commentators consider
the federal courts a superior forum in which to litigate complex ques-
tions of fairness among parties to commercial transactions. Professor
Kaplan has cited the superior skill and experience of the federal
judiciary: "[F]ederal judges are likely to be more sophisticated in
understanding the complexities of commercial and financial transac-
tions. After all, wrestling with the federal income tax makes corporate
and securities litigation seem almost child's play." 5 There also seems
to be the feeling that state judges' biases may make them less likely
to provide protection for shareholders. Professor Jennings has stated:
Many counsel ... have the suspicion, despite announced judicial
professions concerning fiduciary doctrine, that state court judges
may in reality be somewhat less receptive and less likely to enforce
fiduciary doctrine to its fullest extent and are somewhat more likely
to manipulate findings of fact in such a fashion that the doctrine
does not apply broadly."
While this writer is convinced that the federal judiciary is better
equipped to handle fairness cases, there is another benefit that would
have been recognized if the Supreme Court had assumed jurisdiction
95. Kaplan, supra note 45, at 1000.
96. Jennings, supra note 38, at 893. As a specific example of the difference between
state and federal courts, one could cite Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp.
198 (D. Del. 1943), affl'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944), where it appeared quite clear
that one federal judge would like to apply a more rigorous standard in a recapitaliza-
tion case than the standard applied in Delaware.
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under Rule 10b-5. Specifically, the Court would have adopted a
federal standard of fairness, which would have been a new standard
unencumbered by existing state precedents on the matter. The result
would have been a fresh look at a complex problem taken in a forum
that appears better equipped to articulate and apply fairness con-
straints.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court declined this opportunity to
bring fairness and intelligibility to an area of the law in which abusive
conduct has gone unconstrained for decades. One can only wonder
whether the Court's rush to "de-federalize" corporate law justifies a
disregard for basic fairness.
V. CONCLUSION
It is quite possible that the Supreme Court may continue to restrict
the scope of the securities acts and thus continue to push more corpo-
rate questions into state forums. While the present Court seems un-
able to resist this impulse, one must question the apparent blind
vigor with which the goal is being pursued. Without some governor,
the result will be more cases like Santa Fe Industries, in which it
appears that notions of federalism caused the Court to deny effective
relief to powerless shareholders.
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